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Abstract
We explore the relation between two natural symmetry properties of voting
rules. The first is transitive-symmetry — the property of invariance to a transitive
permutation group — while the second is the “unbiased” property of every voter
having the same influence for all i.i.d. probability measures. We show that these
properties are distinct by two constructions — one probabilistic, one explicit — of
rules that are unbiased but not transitive-symmetric.
1 Introduction
We study voting rules: functions Φ : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} that map a voting profile —
the preferences of a set V = [n] of n voters between alternatives −1 and 1 — to an
outcome in {−1, 1}. We restrict our attention to voting rules Φ that are odd, i.e. such
that Φ(−x) = −Φ(x), and monotone, i.e. such that Φ(x) > Φ(x′) whenever x > x′
coordinate-wise.
Let Sn be the set of permutations over V . For a permutation σ ∈ Sn, we define a
permutation of a voting rule Φ as (σΦ)(x) = Φ(σ−1(x)). We say that σ is an automorphism
of Φ if σΦ = Φ. We denote by aut(Φ) the automorphism group of Φ. A voting rule Φ
is said to be transitive-symmetric if aut(Φ) is transitive, i.e. for every pair of voters
u, v ∈ V , there is an automorphism σ ∈ aut(Φ) such that σ(u) = v. Intuitively, transitive-
symmetric voting rules define “equitable” elections where each voter plays the same “role”
in determining the final outcome. These objects were studied in detail by [2], who call
them “equitable voting rules.”
For any voting rule Φ and a probability measure q over {−1, 1}n, voter i’s influence
on Φ is the probability that they are pivotal for a voting profile chosen from q. More
formally, for any x ∈ {−1, 1}n, let x⊕i = (x1, . . . , xi−1,−xi, xi+1, . . . , xn) be the voting
profile obtained when only voter i changes their vote from x. We say i is pivotal for x in
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Φ if Φ(x) 6= Φ(x⊕i), and the influence of i on Φ with respect to probability measure q on
{−1, 1}n is
Ipi (Φ) = P
x∼q
[
Φ(x) 6= Φ(x⊕i)]
We say that a voting rule Φ is unbiased if Iq1(Φ) = · · · = Iqn(Φ) for every i.i.d. probability
measure q = p⊗n on {−1, 1}n. It is easy to see that all transitive-symmetric voting rules
are unbiased, but it is unclear whether the converse holds. Our main theorem shows that
the two properties are distinct:1
Theorem 1. For all n odd and large enough, there exist odd, monotone voting rules
Φ : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} that are unbiased but not transitive-symmetric.
We prove Theorem 1 by introducing a class of graphic voting rules defined by an
underlying graph (Section 2). Informally, we associate transitive-symmetric voting rules
to vertex-transitive graphs, and unbiased voting rules to regular graphs. This construction
reduces our task to proving the existence of d-regular graphs that satisfy certain properties.
In Section 3, we provide a probabilistic existence proof inspired by [4] showing that the
graphic voting rules of random regular graphs are unbiased and have trivial automorphism
groups with probability 1 − o(1). Section 4 provides an explicit construction of a voting
rule that is unbiased but not transitive-symmetric by composing a specific asymmetric
graphic voting rule with a transitive-symmetric voting rule. However, this construction
is only valid for specific n. Section 5 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Graph Theory
Let G = (V,E) be an unweighted, undirected graph with vertex set V = [n] and edge set
E. We intentionally overload notation because we will associate each vertex of a graph
G to a voter in a voting rule ΦG. For any two vertices u, v ∈ V , let d(u, v) denote the
length of a shortest path between u and v in G. The ball of radius r about a vertex v
in G is the set of all points a distance at most r away from v, i.e. Br(v) = {u ∈ V :
d(u, v) 6 r}. Analogously, we also let Br(G) = {Br(v) : v ∈ V } denote the set of all balls
of radius r in G. The diameter of G is diam(G) = maxu,v∈V d(u, v), and the radius of G is
rad(G) = ddiam(G)/2e. While this definition of the graph radius is non-standard, it has
the attractive property that rad(G) = min{r ∈ R : Br(u) ∩Br(v) 6= ∅ ∀u, v ∈ V }.
For a permutation σ ∈ Sn, let σ(G) = (V, {{σ(u), σ(v)} : {u, v} ∈ E}) be the graph
obtained by using σ to permute the endpoints of every edge in G. If σ(G) = G, then we
say that σ is an automorphism of G, or σ ∈ aut(G). Analogously, if Br(σ(G)) = Br(G),
then we say that σ is an automorphism of Br(G), or σ ∈ aut(Br(G)). Note that while
aut(G) ⊆ aut(Br(G)), it is unclear when the converse holds. Figure 1 provides two
examples where aut(G) = aut(B1(G)).
1We only consider odd n because it is a long-standing open question for which even n there exist odd,
monotone, transitive-symmetric voting rules [3].
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(a) This 3-regular graph is not vertex-transitive,
though it still has nontrivial automorphisms.
(b) This 4-regular graph is totally asymmetric, i.e.
it has no non-trivial automorphisms.
Figure 1: Regular graphs that are not vertex-transitive and have aut(G) = aut(B1(G)).
The graphic voting rule associated with the graph in Figure 1b is unbiased but not
transitive-symmetric.
We say that a graph is vertex-transitive if for every pair of vertices u, v ∈ V , there
is an automorphism σ ∈ aut(G) such that σ(u) = v. We say that G is asymmetric
if |aut(G)| = 1, i.e. the identity is the only automorphism of G. We define vertex-
transitivity and asymmetry for Br(G) analogously. Finally, we call a graph d-regular if
all of its vertices have degree d. It is easy to see that all vertex-transitive graphs must be
regular, though the converse need not hold (Figure 1).
2.2 Winning Coalitions of Voting Rules
A winning coalition for a voting rule Φ is a set of voters S ⊆ [n] such that if a voting
profile x ∈ {−1, 1}n has xi = y for all i ∈ S, then Φ(x) = y. We say that a winning
coalition S is minimal if no strict subset T ⊂ S of it is also a winning coalition. We note
that Φ is odd and monotone if and only if the winning coalitions for both alternatives −1
and 1 are equal, and any superset of a winning coalition is also a winning coalition. This
observation gives rise to the following characterization of odd, monotone voting rules:
Definition 2. For any odd n, let F ⊆ 2[n] be a family of sets such that T ∩ S 6= ∅ and
S 6⊂ T for all S, T ∈ F . Define the voting rule ΦF : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} as
ΦF(x) =
{
y ∃S ∈ F s.t. xi = y ∀i ∈ S
majn(x) otherwise
ΦF is well-defined only if F is an intersecting family of sets. This is because every
S ∈ F is a minimal winning coalition for ΦF (minimality follows because S 6⊂ T for
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any S, T ∈ F). We call a voter i pivotal for a winning coalition S if S \ {i} is not a
winning coalition. This re-framing of voting rules in terms of winning coalitions gives us
the following characterization of odd, monotone, unbiased voting rules:
Lemma 3. Let Φ : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} be an odd, monotone voting rule with minimal
winning coalitions F . Φ is unbiased if and only if every voter i is pivotal for an equal
number of winning coalitions of each size.
Proof. Let Fi = {T : ∃!S ∈ F s.t. i ∈ S and S ⊆ T} be the set of winning coalitions
of Φ for which voter i is pivotal, and let Fi,j = {S ∈ Fi : |S| = j} be the subset of
these coalitions with size j. If we let mi,j = |Fi,j|, then for any probability measure p on
{−1, 1}, voter i has influence
Ip
⊗n
i (Φ) =
∑
S∈Fi
P
x∼q⊗n
[(xj = y ∀j ∈ S \ {i}) ∧ (xj = −y ∀j /∈ S \ {i})]
+
∑
S∈Fi
P
x∼q⊗n
[(xj = y ∀j ∈ S) ∧ (xj = −y ∀j /∈ S)]
=
n∑
j=1
mi,jcj(p)
where, with the slight abuse of notation Px∼p [x = 1] = p, the coefficients are cj(p) =
pj−1(1− p)n−j+1 + pn−j+1(1− p)j−1 + pj(1− p)n−j + pn−j(1− p)j. Because Φ is unbiased,
we know that
∑n
j=1m1,jcj(p) = · · · =
∑n
j=1mn,jcj(p) for all p. This is possible if and only
if m1,j = · · · = mn,j for each j ∈ [n].
We can also lower bound the size of the smallest winning coalition of any odd, mono-
tone, unbiased voting rule:
Lemma 4. Let Φ : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} be an odd, monotone, unbiased voting rule with
minimal winning coalitions F . Then, |S| > d√ne for all S ∈ F .
Proof. Let k = min{|S| : S ∈ F} be the size of a smallest winning coalition of Φ (call it
a minimum winning coalition) and let F∗ = ⋃ni=1F∗i be the set of all minimum winning
coalitions. Let mi = |{S ∈ F∗ : i ∈ S}| and m = |F∗|. Since Φ is unbiased and every
participating voter is pivotal for a minimum winning coalition, m1 = · · · = mn = mk/n
by Lemma 3 and the fact that
∑n
i=1mi = mk.
Therefore, for any S ∈ F∗, ∑i∈S∑T∈F 1[i ∈ T ] = ∑i∈Smi = mk2/n. This implies
that the elements of S collectively appear in at most mk2/n different T ∈ F∗. Finally,
because F∗ ⊆ F is an intersecting family of sets with |F∗| = m, we can conclude that
m 6 mk2/n =⇒ k > √n. Since k ∈ Z, this implies that k > d√ne.
It is worth noting that [2] proved that |S| > d√ne for all S ∈ F when Φ is transitive-
symmetric (Theorem 2), and moreover, there exist transitive-symmetric Φ for which this
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lower bound is tight (Theorem 6). Our Lemma 4 has just shown that the lower bound even
holds under the weaker condition Φ is unbiased. Our Theorem 16 proves that this lower
bound is tight up to a constant factor if Φ is unbiased but not transitive-symmetric, but
it is unclear whether the bound is achieved exactly by any voting rules that are unbiased
but not transitive-symmetric.
2.3 Graphic Voting Rules
We consider voting rules that equate the set of voters with the vertices of an underlying
graph G. To avoid treating ties in a voting model that only admits strict preferences, we
assume |V | = n is odd. The graphic voting rule associated to a graph G of radius r is just
ΦG = ΦBr(G), i.e.
ΦG(x) = ΦBr(G)(x) =
{
y ∃v ∈ V s.t. xi = y ∀i ∈ Br(v)
majn(x) otherwise
We make a few remarks about this definition, some of which will motivate us to impose
additional assumptions on the graph G underlying the voting rule ΦG.
1. ΦG is a valid voting rule that is odd and monotone because Br(G) is an intersecting
family of sets by our definition of the graph radius.
2. Because ΦG is uniquely determined by G’s balls of radius r, we know that aut(ΦG) ⊆
aut(Br(G)). So if Br(G) is not vertex-transitive, then ΦG is not transitive-symmetric.
3. We can assume that diam(G) = 2 (and therefore rad(G) = 1) without loss of general-
ity: if rad(G) = r, let G′ = (V, {{u, v} : u ∈ V, v ∈ Br(u)}) be the graph obtained by
connecting all the vertices of G in balls of radius r. It is easy to see that rad(G′) = 1
and ΦG = ΦG′ . We ignore the trivial case where where diam(G
′) = 1 and G′ is just
the complete graph.
4. We further assume that G is d-regular and has all balls of radius 1 distinct. Then,
every voter in ΦG participates in exactly d+ 1 minimum winning coalitions, each of
size d+ 1.
5. To ensure that ΦG 6= majn, we further assume that G is d-regular with d 6 (n−3)/2.
Theorem 6 shows that 3 - 5 are reasonable assumptions, even in conjunction. We now
provide an explicit example of an odd, monotone voting rule on n = 11 voters that is
unbiased but not transitive-symmetric:
Theorem 5. Let G be the graph depicted in Figure 1b. Then ΦG is an odd, monotone,
unbiased voting rule with |aut(ΦG)| = 1, i.e. ΦG is totally asymmetric.
Proof. G is a 4-regular graph on 11 vertices with diam(G) = 2 and all balls of radius 1
distinct. One can also check through exhaustive computation that aut(B1(G)) is trivial.
Therefore, ΦG : {−1, 1}11 → {−1, 1} is such that aut(ΦG) ⊆ aut(B1(G)) = {id}, and each
of the 11 voters participates in exactly 5 minimum winning coalitions of size 5. Because
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these are the only winning coalitions in which ΦG differs from majority rule, every voter
is pivotal to an equal number of winning coalitions of each size. By Lemma 3, this implies
that ΦG is unbiased.
3 A Probabilistic Construction
Here, we use the probabilistic method to prove the existence of a class of regular graphs
whose associated graphic voting rules are totally asymmetric, unbiased, and have winning
coalitions of size b0.293nc. This result immediately implies our main Theorem 1. More
specifically, let Gn,d be the uniform distribution over d-regular graphs on n vertices, where
nd is even. For our purposes, this means that n is odd and d is even. Theorem 6 shows
that probability of sampling a graph of interest from Gn,d is 1−o(1), as long as the degree
d is large enough:
Theorem 6. Let G ∼ Gn,d with
√
n log n 6 d 6 n/2. Then, with probability 1 − o(1),
|aut(B1(G))| = 1 and |B1(u) ∩B1(v)| = (1 + o(1))d2/n for every pair of vertices u 6= v.
When taken together with the following result, our main Theorem 1 follows:
Theorem 7. Let G be a d-regular graph with b0.293nc−1 6 d 6 (n−3)/2, |aut(B1(G))| =
1, and |B1(u) ∩B1(v)| = (1 + o(1))d2/n for every pair of vertices u 6= v. If n is odd, then
ΦG is an odd, monotone, unbiased voting rule with |aut(ΦG)| = 1. Moreover, ΦG has
winning coalitions of size d+ 1.
Proof. Because 0 < |B1(u) ∩B1(v)| = (1 + o(1))d2/n < d+ 1 for all u 6= v ∈ V , we know
that rad(G) = 1 and all balls of radius 1 are distinct. Therefore, aut(ΦG) ⊆ aut(B1(G)) =
{id}, and each voter participates in exactly d+1 minimum winning coalitions of size d+1.
Now, we prove that ΦG is unbiased.
Let k = maxu6=v |B1(u) ∩B1(v)| = (1+o(1))d2/n be the maximal intersection between
any two minimum winning coalitions of ΦG, and consider the following families of winning
coalitions for each v ∈ V :
Fv = {S ⊇ B1(v) : |S| < min{2(d+ 1)− k, (n+ 1)/2}}
Because |S| < 2(d + 1) − k 6 |B1(u) ∪B1(v)| for all S ∈ F and u 6= v ∈ V , we know
that Fu ∩ Fv = ∅ and |{S ∈ Fu : |S| = t}| = |{S ∈ Fv : |S| = t}| for all t. Moreover, if
S ∈ Fv, then S \ {u} is not a winning coalition for any u ∈ B1(v) (since no S ∈ Fv is a
majority). In words, every voter in B1(v) is pivotal to every winning coalition in Fv.
Now assume that 2(d + 1) − k > (n + 1)/2. Then, ⋃v∈V Fv is exactly the set of all
winning coalitions smaller than a majority. Because every voter v ∈ V participates in
exactly d+ 1 minimum winning coalitions B1(u) of size d+ 1, the analysis above implies
that every voter is pivotal for an equal number of winning coalitions of each size. By
Lemma 3, this implies that ΦG is unbiased.
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Finally, we translate the assumption that 2(d+ 1)− k > (n+ 1)/2 into an assumption
about d. Since, k = (1 + o(1))d2/n, we solve the quadratic inequality 2(d + 1) − (1 +
o(1))d2/n > (n + 1)/2 to obtain the condition that d > (1− 1/√2 + o(1))n. For n large
enough, d > b0.293nc − 1 will suffice.
The remainder of this section proves Theorem 6 as a concentration inequality about
the defect of a random regular graph. Intuitively, the defect of a graph G quantifies just
how asymmetric its balls B1(G) of radius 1 are. More formally, we have the following
definition and lemma, inspired by [4]:
Definition 8. Let G = (V,E) be a graph, and let σ, pi ∈ Sn be permutations of V . The
defect of a vertex v with respect to σ and pi is
Dσ,pi(v) = |σ(B1(v)) ∆ B1(pi(v))|
where ∆ denotes the symmetric difference. Analogously, we define the defect of the graph
G with respect to σ and pi as Dσ,pi(G) = maxv∈V Dσ,pi(v).
Lemma 9. Let G = (V,E) be a graph and σ ∈ Sn a permutation of V . Then, σ ∈
aut(B1(G)) if and only if there exists another permutation pi ∈ Sn such that Dσ,pi(G) = 0.
Moreover, σ ∈ aut(G) if and only if Dσ,σ(G) = 0.
Proof. By definition, σ is an automorphism of B1(G) if and only if for every vertex v ∈ V ,
there is another vertex v′ ∈ V such that σ(B1(v)) = B1(v′). In the case where all balls
B1(v) are distinct, this is possible if and only if the mapping v 7→ v′ is a permutation,
which we will call pi. In the general case, pi need not be bijective, but there will always
be a bijective pi for which the desired statement holds biconditionally. Since σ(B1(v)) =
B1(pi(v)) for all v ∈ V , Dσ,pi(G) = 0. The second statement follows from the fact that
σ ∈ aut(G) if and only if {σ(u), σ(v)} ∈ E for every edge {u, v} ∈ E. This is equivalent
to saying that B1(σ(v)) = σ(B1(v)) for every vertex v ∈ V .
Our proof of Theorem 6 closely follows the approach of [4]. Subsection 3.1 proves a
concentration inequality about the defect of an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph, and Subsec-
tion 3.2 uses that result to prove an analogous statement (from which Theorem 6 follows)
about random regular graphs.
3.1 A Result About Erdo˝s-Re´nyi Random Graphs
The Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph distribution G(n, p) is the probability space over graphs
with vertex set V = [n], where each of the
(
n
2
)
possible edges is present independently
with probability p. In this subsection, we prove the following concentration inequality
about the defect of a graph drawn from the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi distribution G(n, p). The proof
closely follows that of Theorem 3.1 in [4]:
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Theorem 10. Let G ∼ G(n, p) with p = ω(log n/n) and 1 − p = ω(log n/n). Then,
there exist permutations σ, pi ∈ Sn such that |{v ∈ V : σ(v) 6= v or pi(v) 6= v}| > ` and
Dσ,pi(G) < (2− o(1))np(1− p) with probability at most
4
n∑
k=`
exp
(−c2np(1− p) + 2 log n)k = o(1)
for some constant c > 0 and any  = (n) such that  = o(1) and 2np(1− p) = ω(log n).
For example, p = log(n)2/n and  = log(n)−1/3 suffice.
Intuitively, Theorem 10 implies that B1(G) from almost every G ∼ G(n, p) is highly
asymmetric. We state the probability bound in a particularly technical way to facilitate
the proof of an analogous theorem about random np-regular graphs in Subsection 3.2. The
centerpiece of our proof of Theorem 10 is the following concentration inequality, which
represents a refinement of McDiarmid’s bounded difference inequality [6] to the special
case of Bernoulli random variables:
Lemma 11 (Alon et al. [1]). Let X be a random variable on a probability space generated
by finitely many independent Bernoulli random variables Yi ∼ Bern(pi). Let δ be such
that changing any Yi (keeping all others the same) can change X by at most δ. Define
∆2 = δ2
∑
i pi(1− pi). Then, for all 0 < t < 2∆/δ, P [|X − E [X]| > t∆] 6 2e−t
2/4.
Proof (Theorem 10). Let σ, pi ∈ Sn be permutations of the vertices of G, and let U =
{v ∈ V : σ(v) 6= v or pi(v) 6= v} be the vertices not fixed in place by σ and pi. Let k = |U |,
and assume that k > 0 for non-triviality. Next, let X =
∑
v∈U Dσ,pi(v). We will apply
Lemma 11 to the random variable X later in the proof.
For any vertex v ∈ U , let Euv1 be the event that u ∈ σ(B1(v)) \ B1(pi(v)) and let Euv2
be the event that u ∈ B1(pi(v)) \ σ(B1(v)). Euv1 occurs if and only if {σ−1(u), v} ∈ E and
{u, pi(v)} /∈ E, while Euv2 occurs if and only if {u, pi(v)} ∈ E and {σ−1(u), v} /∈ E. Since
v is moved by at least one of σ or pi (by the assumption that v ∈ U), this implies that
E [Dσ,pi(v)] =
∑
u∈V
P [Euv1 ∪ Euv2 ] =
{
2(n− 1)p(1− p) pi(σ(v)) = v
2(n− 2)p(1− p) otherwise
where the terms (n − 1) and (n − 2) account for cases where u = pi(v) and σ−1(u) = v.
Therefore,
E [X] =
∑
v∈U
E [Dσ,pi(v)] = (2− o(1))knp(1− p)
Now, we analyze how the presence of edges in G influences the value of X. First, we
note that X only depends on edges of the graph incident to vertices in U . There are
k(n − k) + (k
2
)
such edges. Second, adding or deleting an edge {u, v} from G can only
change the values of the following six summands, each by at most 1: Dσ,pi(u), Dσ,pi(v),
Dσ,pi(σ
−1(u)), Dσ,pi(σ−1(v)), Dσ,pi(pi−1(u)), and Dσ,pi(pi−1(v)). This means that X satisfies
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the hypothesis of Lemma 11 with parameters δ = 6 and ∆2 = 36(k(n−k)+(k
2
)
)p(1−p) =
Θ(knp(1− p)). So for some constant c > 0,
P [|X − E [X]| > 2knp(1− p)] 6 exp(−c2knp(1− p))
Therefore, with probability at least 1− exp(−c2knp(1− p)),
Dσ,pi(G) > max
v∈U
Dσ,pi(v) >
1
k
(E [X]− 2knp(1− p)) = (2− o(1))np(1− p)
To bound the probability that this bound holds for all σ, pi ∈ Sn for which k = |U | > `, we
will take a union bound. There are at most
(
n
k
)
k! 6 nk permutations that exactly fix n−k
vertices, so there are at most
∑k
i=0
∑k
j=0 n
inj 6 4n2k pairs of permutations pi and σ that fix
exactly n−k vertices between them, i.e. for which |U | = k. Therefore, there exists a non-
trivial pair of permutations pi and σ for which |U | > ` and Dσ,pi(G) < (2− o(1))np(1− p)
with probability at most
n∑
k=`
4n2k exp
(−c2knp(1− p)) = 4 n∑
k=`
exp
(−c2np(1− p) + 2 log n)k
3.2 Proof of Theorem 6
Theorem 6 follows immediately from Lemmas 12 and 13:
Lemma 12 (Krivelevich et al. [5]). Let G ∼ Gn,d. If
√
n log n 6 d 6 n − n/ log2 n,
then with probability 1− o(1), |B1(u) ∩B1(v)| = (1 + o(1))d2/n for every pair of vertices
u 6= v in G. If instead log n 6 d 6 √n log n, then with probability 1− o(1), there exists a
constant  > 0 such that |B1(u) ∩B1(v)| < d1− for every pair of vertices u 6= v in G.
Lemma 13. Let G ∼ Gn,d, with d = ω(log n) and d 6 n/2. With probability 1 − o(1),
|aut(B1(G))| = 1, i.e. B1(G) is totally asymmetric.
To prove Lemma 13, we will need two additional technical lemmas from [4]:
Lemma 14 (Kim et al. [4]). Let G ∼ Gn,d with d 6 n3/4 and d = ω(log n). Then, with
probability 1−o(1), every subset of vertices in G of size a 6 nd−1/3 spans at most da/ log d
edges.
Lemma 15 (Kim et al. [4]). Let G ∼ G(n, d/n). For any constant δ > 0 and n sufficiently
large, G is d-regular with probability at least exp
(−nd1/2+δ).
Proof (Lemma 13). The proof closely follows Section 5 of [4], which proves an analogous
result for aut(G), rather than aut(B1(G)). Our strategy for adapting their proof is similar
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to the way we proved Theorem 10. Re-introducing notation from that proof, for any non-
trivial pair permutations σ, pi ∈ Sn, we will let U = {v ∈ V : pi(v) 6= v or σ(v) 6= v} and
W = V \ U . The following observation is critical:
Dσ,pi(v) > |(σ(B1(v)) ∩W ) ∆ (B1(pi(v)) ∩W )|
= (d+ 1− |σ(B1(v)) ∩ U |) + (d+ 1− |B1(pi(v)) ∩ U |)
− 2|σ(B1(v)) ∩B1(pi(v)) ∩W |
= 2d+ 2− |B1(v) ∩ U | − |B1(pi(v)) ∩ U | − 2|B1(v) ∩B1(pi(v)) ∩W | (1)
> 2d− |B1(v) ∩ U | − |B1(pi(v)) ∩ U | − 2|B1(v) ∩B1(pi(v))| (2)
Inequality 1 follows because that σ(v) ∈ U for all v ∈ U and σ(v) = v for all v ∈ V \ U .
Now, we enumerate cases.
1. n3/4 6 d 6 n/2. Then, Lemma 12 tells us that |B1(v) ∩B1(pi(v))| = (1 + o(1))d2/n
with probability 1 − o(1). If we let ` = d1−δ = o(d) for some small constant δ > 0
(δ = 1/100 suffices), we need to analyze two additional sub-cases:
(a) |U | > `. For any graph G, let BG denote the event that there exist permutations
σ, pi ∈ Sn such that |U | > ` and Dσ,pi(G′) < (2 − o(1))d(1 − d/n). By Theorem
10,
P
G′∼G(n,d/n)
[BG′ ] 6 4
n∑
k=`+1
exp
(−c2d(1− d/n) + 2 log n)k
for an appropriately chosen constant c. If we constrain  > d−δ, our assumption
that ` = d1−δ tells us that this probability is at most exp
(−Ω(d2−3δ)) and
therefore
P
G∼Gn,d
[BG] = P
G′∼G(n,d/n)
[BG′ | G′ d-regular]
6 P
G′∼G(n,d/n)
[BG′ ] / P
G′∼G(n,d/n)
[G′ d-regular]
6 exp
(−Ω(d2−3δ) + nd1/2+δ)
The second-to-last line uses the fact that P [A | B] 6 P [A] /P [B], and the last
line invokes Lemma 15, which says that G′ is regular with probability at least
exp
(−nd1/2+δ). Finally, because we constrain n3/4 6 d 6 n/2, the final quantity
is o(1) as desired.
(b) |U | 6 `. Then, |B1(v) ∩ U | 6 |U | = o(d) and |B1(pi(v)) ∩ U | 6 |U | = o(d).
Substituting these quantities into Inequality 2, we get that with probability
1− o(1), Dσ,pi(v) > (2− o(1))d(1− d/n) for all non-trivial pairs of permutations
σ and pi for which |U | 6 `.
2. d 6 n3/4 and d = ω(log n). Then, by Lemma 12, |B1(v) ∩B1(pi(v))| = o(d) for all
vertices v with probability 1− o(1). If we let ` = nd−1/3 > d, we have two-sub-cases
again:
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(a) |U | > `. The analysis is nearly identical to case 1(a), and proves the same result.
(b) |U | 6 `. By Lemma 14, with probability 1 − o(1), every subset U ⊆ V of
vertices with |U | 6 ` spans at most d|U |/ log d = o(d) edges. This implies
that with probability 1− o(1), every such U contains a vertex v ∈ U such that
|B1(v) ∩ U | = o(d) and |B1(pi(v)) ∩ U | = o(d). So substituting into Inequality 2,
we get that with probability 1−o(1), Dσ,pi(G) > (2−o(1))d > (2−o(1))d(1−d/n)
for every non-trivial pair of permutations σ and pi for which |U | 6 `.
Therefore, we can conclude that with probability 1− o(1), Dσ,pi(G) > (2− o(1))d(1−
d/n) for every non-trivial pair permutations σ and pi. By Lemma 9, this result implies
that |aut(B1(G))| = 1 with probability 1− o(1).
4 An Explicit Construction
In this section, we explicitly construct a voting rule that is unbiased, neither transitive-
symmetric nor asymmetric, and has winning coalitions of size O(
√
n):
Theorem 16. Let m = q2 + q + 1 for some prime power q, and let n = 11m. Then,
there exists an odd, monotone, unbiased voting rule Φ : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} that is not
transitive symmetric and has winning coalitions of size b1.508√nc+ 5.
We prove Theorem 16 by using the procedure we describe in Lemma 17 to compose the
unbiased but asymmetric graphic voting rule Φ1 of Theorem 5 with a transitive-symmetric
voting rule Φ2 described by [2]. Informally, we consider n2 groups of n1 voters each. We
let each of these groups make a decision using Φ1 and then aggregate these group decisions
using Φ2. More formally,
Lemma 17. Let Φ1 : {−1, 1}n1 → {−1, 1} be an odd, monotone, unbiased voting rule that
is not transitive-symmetric and has winning coalitions of size d1. Let Φ2 : {−1, 1}n2 →
{−1, 1} be an odd, monotone, transitive-symmetric voting rule that has winning coalitions
of size d2. Then, there exists a voting rule Φ : {−1, 1}n1×n2 → {−1, 1} that has winning
coalitions of size d1d2, and is odd, monotone, unbiased, and not transitive-symmetric.
Proof. For X ∈ {−1, 1}n1×n2 , let X(i) = (x1,i, . . . , xn1,i)T ∈ {−1, 1}n2 be the ith column
vector of X, and define
Φ(X) = Φ2
(
Φ1(X
(1)), . . . ,Φ1(X
(n2))
)
Φ is odd and monotone because Φ1 and Φ2 are also odd and monotone. We can form a
winning coalition of size d1d2 for Φ by taking a winning coalition for Φ2 and assigning to
each member of that coalition an entire winning coalition for Φ1.
Now, we show that Φ is unbiased. Because Φ1 is unbiased, every xi,j has an equal
probability of being pivotal to Φ1(X
(j)). Because Φ2 is unbiased, every Φ1(X
(j)) has an
equal probability of being pivotal to Φ(X) = Φ2(Φ1(X
(1)), . . . ,Φ1(X
(n2))). So every xi,j
has an equal probability of being pivotal to Φ(X), i.e. Φ is unbiased.
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Finally, we show that Φ is not transitive-symmetric. Let σ ∈ aut(Φ), so Φ(X) =
Φ(σ−1(X)) for all X ∈ {−1, 1}n1×n2 . By the definition of Φ and the fact that Φ2 is
non-constant, each X must have some σ2,X ∈ aut(Φ2) such that(
Φ1(σ
−1(X)(1)), . . . ,Φ1(σ−1(X)(n2))
)
=
(
Φ1(X
σ−12,X(1)), . . . ,Φ1(X
σ−12,X(n2))
)
Because this must hold for all X and Φ1 is also non-constant, this further implies that
each X must also have some σ1,X ∈ aut(Φ1) such that
σ−1(X)(i) = σ−11,X(X
(σ−12,X(i)))
for all i ∈ [n2]. However, because Φ1 is not transitive-symmetric, there must be some
u, v ∈ [n1] such that σ1,X(u) 6= v for all σ1,X ∈ aut(Φ1). Therefore, we can conclude that
Φ is not transitive-symmetric.
Proof (Theorem 16). Theorem 5 describes a voting rule Φ1 : {−1, 1}11 → {−1, 1} that is
odd, monotone, unbiased, not transitive-symmetric, and has winning coalitions of size 5.
Theorem 6 of [2] constructs a voting rule Φ2 : {−1, 1}m → {−1, 1} that is odd, monotone,
transitive-symmetric, and has winning coalitions of size d√me. Lemma 17 provides an
algorithm to compose Φ1 and Φ2 to obtain a voting rule Φ : {−1, 1}11m → {−1, 1} that
is odd, monotone, unbiased, not transitive-symmetric, and has winning coalitions of size
5d√me 6 5
√
n√
11
+ 5 6 b1.508√nc+ 5.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
We have provided two proofs that there exist voting rules which are unbiased but not
transitive-symmetric. At the crux of our arguments is a class of voting rules defined by
d-regular graphs of diameter 2.
Section 3 provides a probabilistic proof that there exist voting rules that are unbiased
and totally asymmetric (not just not transitive-symmetric). Theorem 6 shows that with
probability 1−o(1), the voting rules defined by random d-regular graphs for d > √n log n
are totally asymmetric and have all voters participate in exactly d+ 1 minimum winning
coalitions of size d+ 1. Theorem 7 shows that if we relax the lower bound on the degree
to d > 0.293n− 1, these voting rules are also unbiased with probability 1− o(1).
Section 4 explicitly constructs a class of voting rule that is unbiased, but neither
transitive-symmetric nor totally asymmetric. On the other hand, this class of voting
rules has much smaller winning coalitions of size O(
√
n), which differs by only a constant
factor from the lower bound of d√ne that we proved in Lemma 4.
We see two possible directions for future work. First, we conjecture that there exist
voting rules that are unbiased, totally asymmetric, and have winning coalitions of size√
n log n+ 1 (i.e. the lower bound of Theorem 7 can be made to match that of Theorem
6). A more sophisticated proof of Lemma 12 may be a fruitful avenue to such a result.
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Second, given the existence of voting rules that are unbiased, neither transitive-
symmetric nor totally asymmetric, and have winning coalitions of size O(
√
n), we con-
jecture that Theorems 6 and 7 can be refined to prove that there exist d-regular graphs
whose associated voting rules are unbiased but not transitive-symmetric (rather than to-
tally asymmetric) as long as d > d√ne − 1 (rather than d > √n log n). In other words,
we believe that the lower bound of Lemma 4 is tight not only in general, but also for our
construction using graphic voting rules.
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